From Portland Harbor in Oregon to New Jersey’s Passaic River, contaminated sediment sites present unique challenges. While the EPA issued guidance documents for addressing contaminated sediment sites in 2002 and 2005, it has since learned many lessons in addressing dozens of such sites. A new memorandum from the EPA’s Office of Land and Emergency Management (OLEM), formerly the Office of Solid Waste and Emergency Response, sets forth 11 recommendations for improving the way the agency’s regional offices handle the complex process of cleaning up contaminated sediments.
On December 1, 2016, following decades of inaction and a court order establishing a deadline by which the proposed rule was to be released, the United States Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) announced that it would publish a proposed rule regulating financial assurances required for parties conducting remediation projects in the hardrock mining industry. Section 108(b) of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (“CERCLA”) directed EPA to develop rules requiring “that classes of facilities establish and maintain evidence of financial responsibility consistent with the degree and duration of risk associated with the production, transportation, treatment, storage, or disposal of hazardous wastes.” 42 U.S.C. 9608(b)(1). Although these rules were required to be promulgated by 1985, EPA never published any rules, which led to a deadline of December 1, 2016 being set by court order in response to a lawsuit complaining that EPA failed to comply with the statute. See In re Idaho Conservation League, 811 F.3d 502 (D.C. Cir. 2016). In the absence of such rules, EPA required financial assurance through negotiated settlements, orders, and guidance.
Recently, the D.C. Circuit threw out the United States Fish & Wildlife Service’s (“FWS”) approval of a conservation plan to reduce the impacts of a proposed wind turbine farm on endangered Indiana bats. In Union Neighbors United Inc. v. Jewell, et al., Docket No. 15-5147, the Court of Appeals held that FWS failed to consider all reasonable alternatives to Buckeye Wind LLC’s (“Buckeye”) plan to limit bat injuries and deaths resulting from encounters with the proposed turbines as required by the National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”).
Recently, the United States Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA” or “the Agency”) shared some preliminary details regarding its impending proposal of financial assurances regulations for the hardrock mining industry. These regulations, which are still under consideration by the Agency, will likely serve as a harbinger of the financial assurances requirements EPA intends to impose on other industries, and collectively, they have the potential to have a significant financial impact on parties responsible for cleaning up contaminated properties.
As we reported, four years ago, in Sackett v. EPA, the U.S. Supreme Court held that a recipient of a compliance order from the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) for allegedly illegal filling of wetlands could directly challenge the order in court, and did not have to wait until EPA filed a lawsuit to enforce the order before obtaining judicial review of its validity. In a recent opinion the Court extended the rationale of Sackett and again lowered the threshold of judicial reviewability, holding that a landowner can seek judicial review of a mere determination by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) that its property contains wetlands whose filling would require a permit under the Clean Water Act.
Since the Supreme Court’s 2007 decision in Massachusetts v. EPA, it has been clear that the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) has the authority under the Clean Air Act (“CAA”) to regulate emissions of greenhouse gases (“GHGs”) from mobile sources because GHGs fall within the CAA’s definition of an “air pollutant.” When EPA sought to regulate GHG emissions from stationary sources (mainly power plants and factories), however, the Court sang a slightly different tune. In Utility Air Regulatory Group v. Environmental Protection Agency (“UARG”), the Court rejected EPA’s attempt to regulate GHG emissions from stationary sources under two regulatory programs based solely on those emissions, while affirming the agency’s ability to regulate such emissions from so-called “anyway” sources that are already undergoing regulatory review because of emissions of other pollutants.
On April 29, 2014, in EPA, et al v. EME Homer City Generation, LP, the United States Supreme Court ruled in favor of the US Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) and its controversial “Transport Rule” which curbed nitrous oxide and sulfur dioxide emissions in 27 upwind states. The Supreme Court held it was appropriate to defer to EPA’s expertise in crafting a method of implementing the Clean Air Act’s (“CAA”) “Good Neighbor” provision to reduce pollution from upwind states onto their downwind neighbors.
In 2006, the U.S. Supreme Court created great confusion in Rapanos v. United States over what wetlands fell within the coverage of the Clean Water Act (CWA) by setting out two separate tests for jurisdiction, one in the four-justice plurality opinion led by Justice Scalia, and one in a separate concurrence by Justice Kennedy. In an attempt to resolve the confusion, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the Army Corps of Engineers jointly released a draft rule. The rule is intended to clarify what streams and wetlands are covered by the Clean Water Act.
On January 13, 2014, EPA issued its final rule authorizing the use of electronic manifests for hazardous wastes. The rule implements provisions of the Hazardous Waste Electronic Manifest Establishment Act (“Act”) signed into law in 2012, which directed EPA to establish a national electronic manifest system for tracking hazardous waste. Although the final rule has been promulgated, the electronic system to handle electronic manifests will not be available until 2015 at the earliest.
The Deposition Not Taken: Eighth Circuit Holds Third Party Document to be Business Records of Another Entity Admissible Under FRE 803(6)
In Residential Funding Co., LLC v. Terrace Mortgage Co., (Docket No. 12-2569, August 7, 2013) the Eighth Circuit upheld a grant of summary judgment, including damages evidenced by records created by a third party and supported by the third party’s affidavit. Ordinarily, an affidavit of a third party, if authenticated under FRE 902(11) (See Klock, New Jersey Practice, V2D, 555 (West 2009) is admissible if an appropriate foundation is laid. See Klock, New Jersey Practice, V2E, 342-43 (West 2012). Proper authentication requires notice of intent to use the affidavit. The affidavit in question apparently was not authenticated in that manner.